




Introduction to Logical Geometry


5. Case Studies and Philosophical Outlook

Lorenz Demey & Hans Smessaert

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1. Basic Concepts and Bitstring Semantics
2. Abstract-Logical Properties of Aristotelian Diagrams, Part I
 - ☞ Aristotelian, Opposition, Implication and Duality Relations
3. Visual-Geometric Properties of Aristotelian Diagrams
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4. Abstract-Logical Properties of Aristotelian Diagrams, Part II
 - ☞ Boolean Structure and Logic-Sensitivity
5. **Case Studies and Philosophical Outlook**





“ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century, almost every serious intellectual advance has had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine; in logic, this is still true at the present day”

- definite descriptions in natural language:
 - the president of the United States
 - the man standing over there
 - the so-and-so
- they can occur in
 - **subject position** e.g. The president was in Hamburg last week.
 - **predicate position** e.g. Donald Trump is currently still the president.

- Russell's quantificational analysis of 'the A is B '

$$\exists x \left(Ax \wedge \forall y (Ay \rightarrow y = x) \wedge Bx \right)$$

- Neale's restricted quantifier notation

$$[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$$

- $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} (\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN}) \wedge (\text{UV})$

$$(\text{EX}) \quad \exists x Ax$$

there exists at least one A

$$(\text{UN}) \quad \forall x \forall y ((Ax \wedge Ay) \rightarrow x = y)$$

there exists at most one A

$$(\text{UV}) \quad \forall x (Ax \rightarrow Bx)$$

all A s are B

- much of the subsequent literature on Russell's quantificational theory of definite descriptions has focused on one of these three conditions

- [the $x: Ax$] $Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} (\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN}) \wedge (\text{UV})$

(EX) $\exists xAx$

there exists at least one A

(UN) $\forall x\forall y((Ax \wedge Ay) \rightarrow x = y)$

there exists at most one A

(UV) $\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$

all A s are B

- much of the subsequent literature on Russell's quantificational theory of definite descriptions has focused on one of these three conditions
- what is the linguistic status of (EX)?
 - Russell: (EX) is part of the **truth conditions** of 'the A is B '
 \Rightarrow if (EX) is false, then 'the A is B ' is false
 - Strawson: (EX) is a **presupposition** of 'the A is B '
 \Rightarrow if (EX) is false, then 'the A is B ' does not have a truth value at all

- [the $x: Ax$] $Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} (\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN}) \wedge (\text{UV})$

(EX) $\exists xAx$

there exists at least one A

(UN) $\forall x\forall y((Ax \wedge Ay) \rightarrow x = y)$

there exists at most one A

(UV) $\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$

all A s are B

- much of the subsequent literature on Russell's quantificational theory of definite descriptions has focused on one of these three conditions
- the problem of **incomplete definite descriptions** (for which (UN) fails)
e.g. the book is on the shelf \Rightarrow there is at most one book in the universe
- refinements and alternatives:
 - ellipsis theories (Vendler)
 - quantifier domain restriction theories (Stanley and Szabó)
 - pragmatic theories (Heim, Szabó)

- [the $x: Ax$] $Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} (\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN}) \wedge (\text{UV})$

(EX) $\exists xAx$

there exists at least one A

(UN) $\forall x\forall y((Ax \wedge Ay) \rightarrow x = y)$

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(UV) $\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$

all A s are B


- much of the subsequent literature on Russell's quantificational theory of definite descriptions has focused on one of these three conditions
- what about **non-singular** definite descriptions?
 - plurals e.g. The wives of King Henry VIII were pale.
 - mass nouns e.g. The water in the Dead Sea is very salty.
- such descriptions also satisfy a version of (UV) (Sharvy, Brogaard)

- Russell: what is the negation of 'the A is B '?
 - law of excluded middle \Rightarrow 'the A is B ' is true or 'the A is not B ' is true
 - but if there are no A s, then both statements seem to be false
- Russell: 'the A is not B ' is **ambiguous** (scope)
 - $\neg\exists x(Ax \wedge \forall y(Ay \rightarrow y = x) \wedge Bx)$ $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$
 - $\exists x(Ax \wedge \forall y(Ay \rightarrow y = x) \wedge \neg Bx)$ $[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$
- first interpretation:
 - Boolean negation of 'the A is B '
 - if there are no A s, then $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ is false, $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ is true
- second interpretation:
 - if there are no A s, then $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ and $[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ are false
 - not the Boolean negation of 'the A is B '

- crucial insight: the two interpretations of ‘the A is not B ’ distinguished by Russell stand in different Aristotelian relations to ‘the A is B ’
 - $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ and $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ are FOL-contradictory
 - $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ and $[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ are FOL-contrary
- cf. Haack (1978), Speranza and Horn (2010, 2012), Martin (2016)
- natural move: consider a **fourth formula** (with two negations)

$\exists x(Ax \wedge \forall y(Ay \rightarrow y = x) \wedge Bx)$	$[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$
$\neg\exists x(Ax \wedge \forall y(Ay \rightarrow y = x) \wedge Bx)$	$\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$
$\exists x(Ax \wedge \forall y(Ay \rightarrow y = x) \wedge \neg Bx)$	$[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$
$\neg\exists x(Ax \wedge \forall y(Ay \rightarrow y = x) \wedge \neg Bx)$	$\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$

- in FOL, these four formulas constitute a **classical square**





- this is an **Aristotelian** square
- but also a **duality** square

👉 lecture 2


- this square is fully defined in ‘ordinary’ FOL \Rightarrow acceptable for Russell
- summarizes Russell’s solution to puzzle on law of excluded middle
- interesting new formula: $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$
 - expresses a weak version of ‘the A is B ’
 $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} [(\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN})] \rightarrow [\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$
 - ▶ if there is exactly one A ,
[the $x: Ax]Bx$ and $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ always have the same truth value
 - ▶ in all other cases,
[the $x: Ax]Bx$ is always false, whereas $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ is always true
 - self-predication principles: what is the logical status of ‘the A is A ’?
 - ▶ [the $x: Ax]Ax$ is not a FOL-tautology
 - ▶ $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Ax$ is a FOL-tautology

- the Aristotelian square for definite descriptions is not Boolean closed
- its Boolean closure is a **JSB hexagon**
- importance of the (EX)- and (UN)-conditions



- consider the formulas in the definite description square/hexagon
- these formulas induce the partition Π_{TDD}^{FOL} :
 - $\alpha_1 := [\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$
 - $\alpha_2 := [\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$
 - $\alpha_3 := \neg[(\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN})]$
- example bitstring representations:
 - $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} \alpha_1 \rightsquigarrow$ gets represented as 100
 - $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} \alpha_1 \vee \alpha_3 \rightsquigarrow$ gets represented as 101
- logical perspective: the Boolean closure of the square/hexagon has $2^3 - 2 = 6$ contingent formulas
- conceptual/linguistic perspective:
recursive partitioning of logical space

- view Π_{TDD}^{FOL} as the result of a process of **recursively partitioning and restricting logical space** (Seuren, Jaspers, Roelandt)
 - divide the logical universe: $(EX) \wedge (UN)$ vs. $\neg[(EX) \wedge (UN)]$
 - focus on the logical subuniverse defined by $(EX) \wedge (UN)$
 - recursively divide this subuniverse: $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ vs. $[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$



- another look at the ambiguity pointed out by Russell
 - 'the A is B ' unambiguously corresponds to $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx = 100$
 - relative to the entire universe, its negation is $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx = 011$
 - relative to the subuniverse (110), its negation is $[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx = 010$
 - \Rightarrow Russell's two interpretations of 'the A is not B ' correspond to negations of 'the A is B ' **relative to two different universes** (semantic instead of syntactic characterization)
- Seuren and Jaspers's (2014) defeasible Principle of Complement Selection: "Natural complement selection is primarily relative to the proximate subuniverse, but there are overriding factors."
- overriding factors: intonation, additional linguistic material (Horn 1989)
 - *the* largest prime is not even; in fact, there doesn't *exist* a largest prime
 - *the* prime divisor of 30 is not even; in fact, 30 has *multiple* prime divisors

- recall the four categorical statements from syllogistics:


A	all As are B	$\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$
I	some As are B	$\exists x(Ax \wedge Bx)$
E	no As are B	$\forall x(Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx)$
O	some As are not B	$\exists x(Ax \wedge \neg Bx)$

- already implicit in the definite description formulas

- $[\text{the } x: Ax] Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} (\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN}) \wedge (\text{UV})$
- $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax] Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} \neg(\text{EX}) \vee \neg(\text{UN}) \vee \neg(\text{UV})$
- $[\text{the } x: Ax] \neg Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} (\text{EX}) \wedge (\text{UN}) \wedge (\text{UV}^*)$
- $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax] \neg Bx \equiv_{\text{FOL}} \neg(\text{EX}) \vee \neg(\text{UN}) \vee \neg(\text{UV}^*)$



(UV)	\equiv_{FOL}	$\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$	$=$	A
$\neg(\text{UV})$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x(Ax \wedge \neg Bx)$	$=$	O
(UV^*)	\equiv_{FOL}	$\forall x(Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx)$	$=$	E
$\neg(\text{UV}^*)$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x(Ax \wedge Bx)$	$=$	I

- first-order logic (FOL) has no existential import
- the categorical statements induce the partition Π_{CAT}^{FOL} :
 - $\beta_1 := \exists x Ax \wedge \forall x (Ax \rightarrow Bx)$
 - $\beta_2 := \exists x (Ax \wedge Bx) \wedge \exists x (Ax \wedge \neg Bx)$
 - $\beta_3 := \exists x Ax \wedge \forall x (Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx)$
 - $\beta_4 := \neg \exists x Ax$ (recursive partitioning)
- in FOL, the categorical statements constitute a **degenerate square**




- there is a subalternation from [the $x: Ax$] Bx to the A-statement
- there is a subalternation from [the $x: Ax$] Bx to the I-statement
- and so on...
- summary:

the interaction between the definite description formulas and the categorical statements gives rise to a **Buridan octagon**




- the definite descriptions induce the 3-partition Π_{TDD}^{FOL}
- the categorical statements induce the 4-partition $\Pi_{\text{CAT}}^{\text{FOL}}$
- ⇒ together, they induce the 6-partition $\Pi_{\text{OCTA}}^{\text{FOL}} = \Pi_{TDD}^{\text{FOL}} \wedge_{\text{FOL}} \Pi_{\text{CAT}}^{\text{FOL}}$
 - $\gamma_1 := \exists x \exists y (Ax \wedge Ay \wedge x \neq y) \wedge \forall x (Ax \rightarrow Bx)$
 - $\gamma_2 := \exists x (Ax \wedge Bx) \wedge \exists x (Ax \wedge \neg Bx)$
 - $\gamma_3 := \exists x \exists y (Ax \wedge Ay \wedge x \neq y) \wedge \forall x (Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx)$
 - $\gamma_4 := [\text{the } x: Ax] Bx$
 - $\gamma_5 := [\text{the } x: Ax] \neg Bx$
 - $\gamma_6 := \neg \exists x Ax$
- $\Pi_{\text{OCTA}}^{\text{FOL}}$ is a refinement of Π_{TDD}^{FOL}
 - ⇒ $\gamma_4 = \alpha_1$ and $\gamma_5 = \alpha_2$, while $\gamma_1 \vee \gamma_2 \vee \gamma_3 \vee \gamma_6 \equiv_{\text{FOL}} \alpha_3$
- $\Pi_{\text{OCTA}}^{\text{FOL}}$ is a refinement of $\Pi_{\text{CAT}}^{\text{FOL}}$
 - ⇒ $\gamma_2 = \beta_2$ and $\gamma_6 = \beta_4$, while $\gamma_1 \vee \gamma_4 \equiv_{\text{FOL}} \beta_1$ and $\gamma_3 \vee \gamma_5 \equiv_{\text{FOL}} \beta_3$

- Π_{OCTA}^{FOL} allows us to encode every formula of the Buridan octagon



- Π_{OCTA}^{FOL} is ordered along two semi-independent dimensions
 - the **cardinality** of (the extension of) A
 - the **proportion** of A s that are B
- **semi-independent**: higher cardinalities allow for more fine-grained proportionality distinctions
- ongoing work on linguistic aspects:
 - plausible partitioning process?
 - split the ' ≥ 2 '-region into ' ≥ 3 '- and ' $= 2$ '-subregions ('both', 'neither')



A related octagon


- recent work on existential import in syllogistics (Seuren, **Chatti and Schang**, Read)
- for every categorical statement φ , define
 - variant $\varphi_{\text{imp}!}$ that explicitly **has** existential import
 - variant $\varphi_{\text{imp}?$ that explicitly **lacks** existential import

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists x Ax \wedge \varphi \\ & \exists x Ax \rightarrow \varphi \end{aligned}$$

$A_{\text{imp}?$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	(UV)
$I_{\text{imp}!$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x(Ax \wedge Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\neg(UV^*)$
$E_{\text{imp}?$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\forall x(Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	(UV^*)
$O_{\text{imp}!$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x(Ax \wedge \neg Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\neg(UV)$
$A_{\text{imp}!$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x Ax \wedge \forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	$(EX) \wedge (UV)$
$I_{\text{imp}?$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x Ax \rightarrow \exists x(Ax \wedge Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\neg(EX) \vee \neg(UV^*)$
$E_{\text{imp}!$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x Ax \wedge \forall x(Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	$(EX) \wedge (UV^*)$
$O_{\text{imp}?$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\exists x Ax \rightarrow \exists x(Ax \wedge \neg Bx)$	\equiv_{FOL}	$\neg(EX) \vee \neg(UV)$

A related octagon

- Chatti and Schang's 8 formulas are closely related to our 8 formulas
- Chatti and Schang's 8 formulas also constitute a **Buridan octagon**
- bitstring analysis: partition $\{A_{\text{imp!}}, I_{\text{imp!}} \wedge O_{\text{imp!}}, E_{\text{imp!}}, \neg \exists x Ax\} = \Pi_{\text{CAT}}^{\text{FOL}}$



A related octagon

- Buridan octagon for definite description formulas and categorical statements
 - induces the partition Π_{OCTA}^{FOL} , with 6 anchor formulas
 - $[\text{the } x: Ax] Bx \not\equiv_{FOL} A \wedge I$ (000100 \neq 100101 \wedge 110100)
 - $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax] \neg Bx \not\equiv_{FOL} A \vee I$ (111101 \neq 100101 \vee 110100)


- Buridan octagon for categorical statements that explicitly have/lack existential import
 - induces the partition Π_{CAT}^{FOL} , with 4 anchor formulas
 - $A_{imp!} \equiv_{FOL} A_{imp?} \wedge I_{imp!}$ (1000 = 1001 \wedge 1100)
 - $I_{imp?} \equiv_{FOL} A_{imp?} \vee I_{imp!}$ (1101 = 1001 \wedge 1100)

- summary:
 - one and the **same Aristotelian family** (Buridan octagons)
 - **different Boolean subtypes**

 lecture 4



- until now: only worked in ordinary first-order logic (FOL)
- Chatti and Schang: deal with existential import by adding $(\neg)\exists xAx$ as conjunct/disjunct to the categorical statements
- alternative approach:
 - existential import \neq property of **individual formulas**
 - existential import = property of **underlying logical system**
- introduce new logical system SYL:
 - SYL = FOL + $\exists xAx$
 - interpreted on FOL-models $\langle D, I \rangle$ such that $I(A) \neq \emptyset$
 - analogy with modal logic:
 - ▶ $KD = K + \diamond T$
 - ▶ interpreted on serial frames,
i.e. K-frames $\langle W, R \rangle$ such that $R[w] \neq \emptyset$ (for all $w \in W$)

- move from FOL to SYL
- influence on the categorical statements:
 - e.g. A and E are unconnected in FOL, but become contrary in SYL, etc.
 - degenerate square turns into classical square
- no influence on the definite description formulas:
 - e.g. $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ and $[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ are contrary in FOL, and remain so in SYL
 - classical square remains classical square
- no influence on the interaction between definite descriptions and categorical statements:
 - e.g. subalternation from $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ to A and I in FOL, and this remains so in SYL
- from Buridan octagon to **Lenzen octagon**



- which partition Π_{OCTA}^{SYL} is induced?
 - SYL is a stronger logical system than FOL
 - consider $\neg\exists x Ax = \gamma_6 \in \Pi_{OCTA}^{SYL}$: FOL-consistent, but SYL-inconsistent
 - $\Pi_{OCTA}^{SYL} = \Pi_{OCTA}^{FOL} - \{\gamma_6\}$
- deleting the sixth bit position \Rightarrow unified perspective on all changes:
 - A (100101) and E (001011) change from unconnected to contrary
 - I (110100) and O (011010) change from unconnected to subcontrary
 - A (100101) and I (110100) change from unconnected to subaltern
 - [the $x: Ax$]Bx (000100) and [the $x: Ax$]Bx (000010) are contrary and remain so
 - [the $x: Ax$]Bx (000100) and A (100101) are subaltern and remain so

- (EX) and (UN) play complementary roles in Russell's theory
- introduce new logical system SYL*
 - $\text{SYL}^* = \text{FOL} + \forall x \forall y ((Ax \wedge Ay) \rightarrow x = y)$
 - interpreted on FOL-models $\langle D, I \rangle$ such that $|I(A)| \leq 1$
- move from FOL to SYL*
- no influence on the definite description formulas
 - e.g. $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ and $[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ are contrary in FOL, and remain so in SYL
 - classical square remains **classical square**
- influence on the categorical statements:
 - e.g. A and E are unconnected in FOL, but become subcontrary in SYL
 - degenerate square turns into **classical square**
 - note: this square is 'flipped upside down'!




- example: take A to be the predicate 'monarch of country C '
- then always $|I(A)| \leq 1$
 - if C is a monarchy, then $|I(A)| = 1$
 - if C is a republic, then $|I(A)| = 0$

- move from FOL to SYL*
- influence on the interaction between definite descriptions and categorical statements
 - e.g. [the $x: Ax$] Bx and the E-statement go from FOL-contrary to SYL*-contradictory
 - e.g. in FOL there is a subalternation from [the $x: Ax$] Bx to the I-statement, but in SYL* they are logically equivalent to each other
- **pairwise collapse** of def. descr. formulas and categorical statements:


$$\begin{array}{llll}
 [\text{the } x: Ax] Bx & \equiv_{\text{SYL}^*} & \text{I} & = & \exists x(Ax \wedge Bx) \\
 \neg[\text{the } x: Ax] Bx & \equiv_{\text{SYL}^*} & \text{E} & = & \forall x(Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx) \\
 [\text{the } x: Ax] \neg Bx & \equiv_{\text{SYL}^*} & \text{O} & = & \exists x(Ax \wedge \neg Bx) \\
 \neg[\text{the } x: Ax] \neg Bx & \equiv_{\text{SYL}^*} & \text{A} & = & \forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx)
 \end{array}$$

- from Buridan octagon to **collapsed (flipped) classical square**



- elementary calculation yields the partition $\Pi_{COLL}^{SYL^*}$
 $= \{\exists x Ax \wedge \forall x(Ax \rightarrow Bx), \exists x Ax \wedge \forall x(Ax \rightarrow \neg Bx), \neg \exists x Ax\}$
- $\Pi_{COLL}^{SYL^*} = \Pi_{OCTA}^{FOL} - \{\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3\}$
 - SYL* is a stronger logical system than FOL
 - $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3$ are FOL-consistent, but SYL*-inconsistent
- $\Pi_{COLL}^{SYL^*} = \Pi_{TDD}^{FOL}$
 - Π_{TDD}^{FOL} is the partition for the def. descr. square in FOL
 - moving from FOL to SYL* did not change this square
 - but did cause it to coincide with the categorical statement square
- $\Pi_{COLL}^{SYL^*} = \Pi_{CAT}^{FOL} - \{\beta_2\}$
 - Π_{CAT}^{FOL} is the partition for the cat. statement square in FOL
 - SYL* is a stronger than FOL; β_2 is FOL-consistent, but SYL*-inconsistent
 - moving from FOL to SYL* triggered change from degen. square to (flipped) classical square, which coincides with the def. descr. square

- Aristotelian diagrams for Russell's theory of definite descriptions
 - classical square, JSB hexagon, Buridan octagon. . .
 - the formula $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ and its interpretation, negations of $[\text{the } x: Ax]Bx$ relative to different subuniverses. . .
- phenomena and techniques studied in logical geometry
 - bitstring analysis, Boolean closure. . .
 - Boolean subtypes, logic-sensitivity. . .



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- recall the guiding metaphor:
 - Aristotelian diagrams constitute a **language**
 - logical geometry is the **linguistics** that studies that language

- double motivation for logical geometry:
 - Aristotelian diagrams as **objects of independent interest**
 - Aristotelian diagrams as a **widely-used language**



- fundamental question:
 - **why** are Aristotelian diagrams used so widely to begin with?
 - **which reasons** do the authors themselves offer for their usage?

(practice-based philosophy of logic)

- ① the received view: Aristotelian diagrams as **pedagogical devices**
 - ② the **multimodal** nature of Aristotelian diagrams
 - ③ the **implicit normativity** of the tradition of using Aristotelian diagrams
 - ④ Aristotelian diagrams as **heuristic tools**
- these explanations are **not mutually exclusive**
 - Aristotelian diagrams as **technologies** or instruments
 - a technology can be created with one function in mind
 - and later acquire another function
 - the latter can even become the primary function


- Aristotelian diagrams are mainly **pedagogical devices**
- visual nature \Rightarrow **mnemonic** value
- helpful to introduce novice students to the abstract discipline of logic
- Kruja et al., *History of Graph Drawing*, 2002:
“Squares of opposition were pedagogical tools used in the teaching of logic . . . They were designed to facilitate the recall of knowledge that students already had”
- Nicole Oresme, *Le livre du ciel et du monde*, 1377:
“In order to illustrate this, I clarify it by means of a figure very similar to that used to introduce children to logic.”
(Et pour ce mieux entendre, je le desclaire en une figure presque semblable a une que l'en fait pour la premiere introduction des enfans en logique.)





- the received view was accurate **in the past**:
Aristotelian diagrams indeed were primarily/exclusively teaching tools
- but **today**, Aristotelian diagrams occur
 - not only in textbooks on logic
 - but mainly in **research-level** papers/monographs on **various disciplines** (logic, linguistics, psychology, computer science, etc.)








- Aristotelian diagrams offer cognitive advantages, because of their **multimodal** nature (visual + symbolic/textual)
- Aristotelian diagrams as a **visual summary** of some of the key properties of the logical system under investigation
- analogy: graph vs. raw numeric data
- comparison with the received view:
 - both emphasize the **cognitive advantages** of Aristotelian diagrams
 - the second view accommodates **teaching and research** contexts



- Béziau, 2013:
“The use of such a coloured diagram is very useful to understand in a direct, quick and synthetic way basic notions of modern logic, corresponding to the notion of Übersichtlichkeit [surveyability] that Wittgenstein was fond of”
- Ciucci, Dubois & Prade, 2015:
“Opposition structures are a powerful tool to express all properties of rough sets and fuzzy rough sets w.r.t. negation in a synthetic way.”
- Eilenberg & Steenrod, 1952 (commutative diagrams in alg. topology):
“The diagrams incorporate a large amount of information. Their use provides extensive savings in space and in mental effort.”

Problem

- the second view fits well with **visually 'simple'** diagrams such as the square of opposition
- but what about **more visually complex** diagrams?



- Aristotelian diagrams have a **very rich and respectable tradition** within the broader history of logic: many famous authors made use of these diagrams
- the tradition of using Aristotelian diagrams gets endowed with a kind of **(implicit) normativity** (tradition itself as object of reverence)
- Banerjee et al., 2018:
“many artificial intelligence knowledge representation settings are sharing the same structures of opposition that extend or generalise the traditional square of opposition which dates back to Aristotle”
- Ciucci, 2016:
“The study of oppositions starts in ancient Greece and has its main result in the Square of Opposition by Aristotle. In the last years, we can assist to a renewal of interest in this topic.”

- this provides a (partial) explanation as to why we **continue** to use Aristotelian diagrams
- it takes the tradition of using Aristotelian diagrams as its starting point
- but how/why did this tradition **start** in the first place?

- Aristotelian diagrams as **heuristic tools**
- they enable researchers
 - to draw **high-level analogies** between seemingly unrelated frameworks
 - to introduce **new concepts** (by transferring them across frameworks)
- Aristotelian relations = 'right' layer of abstraction
 - not overly specific (otherwise, no analogies are possible)
 - not overly general (otherwise, the analogies become vacuous)

- Ciucci et al., 2014:
The Structure of Oppositions in Rough Set Theory and Formal Concept Analysis - Toward a New Bridge between the Two Settings
- Dubois et al., 2015:
The Cube of Opposition - A Structure underlying many Knowledge Representation Formalisms
- Read, 2012:
“Buridan was able [...] to exhibit a strong analogy between modal, oblique and nonnormal propositions in his three octagons”

- think back of $\neg[\text{the } x: Ax]\neg Bx$ from the case study
- Yao, 2013:

“With respect to the four logic expressions of the square of opposition, we can identify four subsets of attributes. [...] While the set of core attributes is well studied, the other [three] sets of attributes received much less attention.”



Strategy for the future

typology

- discover systematic regularities in logical behavior
- extrapolate new diagrams and predict their behavior

Group	→1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
Period	1																		2
1	1 H																		2 He
2	3 Li	4 Be											5 B	6 C	7 N	8 O	9 F	10 Ne	
3	11 Na	12 Mg											13 Al	14 Si	15 P	16 S	17 Cl	18 Ar	
4	19 K	20 Ca	21 Sc	22 Ti	23 V	24 Cr	25 Mn	26 Fe	27 Co	28 Ni	29 Cu	30 Zn	31 Ga	32 Ge	33 As	34 Se	35 Br	36 Kr	
5	37 Rb	38 Sr	39 Y	40 Zr	41 Nb	42 Mo	43 Tc	44 Ru	45 Rh	46 Pd	47 Ag	48 Cd	49 In	50 Sn	51 Sb	52 Te	53 I	54 Xe	
6	55 Cs	56 Ba		72 Hf	73 Ta	74 W	75 Re	76 Os	77 Ir	78 Pt	79 Au	80 Hg	81 Tl	82 Pb	83 Bi	84 Po	85 At	86 Rn	
7	87 Fr	88 Ra		104 Rf	105 Db	106 Sg	107 Bh	108 Hs	109 Mt	110 Ds	111 Rg	112 Cn	113 Uut	114 Fl	115 Uup	116 Lv	117 Uus	118 Uuo	
Lanthanides	57 La	58 Ce	59 Pr	60 Nd	61 Pm	62 Sm	63 Eu	64 Gd	65 Tb	66 Dy	67 Ho	68 Er	69 Tm	70 Yb	71 Lu				
Actinides	89 Ac	90 Th	91 Pa	92 U	93 Np	94 Pu	95 Am	96 Cm	97 Bk	98 Cf	99 Es	100 Fm	101 Md	102 No	103 Lr				

typology

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database

- help to avoid idle armchair theorizing
- discover new types of logical behavior



typology


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
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interplay

- Aristotelian diagrams as heuristic devices
- unexpected analogies
- introducing new concepts



- Aristotelian diagrams as **objects of independent interest**
- Aristotelian diagrams as a **widely-used language**



Thank you! Questions?

More info: www.logicalgeometry.org